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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Additional significance is added to the principal case by the de-,
cision of the United States Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wain-
wright 5 where the Court decreed that counsel must be provided in
criminal cases.26 Since all accused now have the right to counsel,
the corollary right to adequate opportunity to prepare the defense
is also extended. While State v. Lane and Gideon v. Wainwright
are large steps forward in the protection of the rights of those
accused of non-capital crimes, there are many problems which remain
unanswered. The courts have the duty both to provide the defendant
a speedy trial and to clear overcrowded trial dockets. A continuance
in every case could frustrate the speed of justice and cause adminis-
trative turmoil and unnecessary delay. On the other hand, appoint-
ment of counsel to represent indigent defendants will involve all
members of the bar, including those who do not deal primarily with
criminal cases. As a result continuance to allow proper preparation
by attorneys will be essential in carrying out the purposes of such
an appointment.
As the principal case held, the immediate solution to the problem
has been to make the denial of continuance appealable. The most
obvious alternative solution to the problem would be a statute similar
to G.S. § 15-4.1 which would provide for an automatic continuance,
in proper circumstances, upon motion of counsel. However, statu-
tory procedures alone can never fully satisfy due process in every
case. Ultimately the solution must lie in an increased awareness of
this problem and a sympathetic treatment of the indigent by the trial
judiciary. It is believed that the trial judges, having been apprised
of the problem as presented in the principal case, are equal to the
task. Tom D. EFIRD
Damages-Collateral Source Rule-Pensions as Reducing Factor on
Personal Injury
In Browning v. The War Office1 the English Court of Appeal
considered the question of reducing an award for damages by the
friends or relatives nearby to be at the trial to testify in his behalf, State v.
Hedgebeth, 228 N.C. 259, 45 S.E.2d 563 (1947).25 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 8In Gideon v. Wainwright the Court did not expressly extend the deci-
sion to cover all criminal prosecutions, but certainly all felonies are included
within the rule.
, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
[1963] 2 Weekly L R. 52 (C.A.).
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-amount of a disability pension which the plaintiff was receiving.
Plaintiff, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, lost his arm
in an automobile collision while stationed in England. The injury
resulted in his-discharge and an award of a disability pension amount-
ing to nearly one-half of the salary he had been receiving. Plaintiff's
-claim for recovery was predicated on his loss of earnings,, and the
trial court awarded damages without considering the pension. Here-
tofore, the leading English case on the subject had held that pensions
were in that class of collateral sources along with plaintiff's insurance
and gifts which do not go to mitigate loss of earnings.2 But on
appeal, in Browning, the court held that this precedent had been
overruled- and that pensions were the equivalent of earnings and
were allowed to mitigate damages.
With this decision England has adopted a purely compensatory
theory of damages whereby the aim is to compensate the injured
party for the loss of earnings sustained, and nothing more. This
theory is based on the logic that no matter how serious the actual
injury is to the plaintiff in terms of lost income, the defendant should
not be required to compensate plaintiff for more than the difference
in income prior to the injury and income from both earnings and
collateral sources after the injury. For example, in the present case
plaintiff was receiving 450 dollars a month in earnings prior to the
injury. After the injury, and the termination of his regular salary,
plaintiff began to receive 217 dollars a month as a disability benefit
from the United States government. Some courts might say that
the plaintiff was injured in the amount of 450 dollars a month by
'In Payne v. Railway Executive, [1952] 1 K.B. 26, the English court had
held that pension payments to which a serviceman was entitled could not be
considered when figuring pecuniary loss, especially since the pension could
be reduced after the judgment at the discretion of the authorities.
'The court held that Payne v. Railway Executive had been overruled by
British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley [1956] 2 Weekly L.R. 41. Gourley dealt
exclusively with the question of taxes being considered in figuring damages.
The court held taxes a valid consideration in the computation of pecuniary
loss for personal injury, stating that damages should compensate and not
punish. Now, by analogy, the court decides that to award plaintiff damages
for losses which are covered by disability pensions would be to punish the
defendant.
The Gourley case itself is contrary to the predominant American view
regarding taxes. E.g., Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) ;
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d 874 (1956);
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). These cases gen-
erally hold that the income tax savings should not be considered when fixing
damages for loss of earnings because of personal injuries. Contra, Floyd v.
Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957).
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losing his status in the Air Force. But by applying the compensa-
tory theory and taking into consideration the income from the col-
lateral source the court in Browning concluded that the plaintiff's
injury was 233 dollars per month and not 450 dollars.
Not all income from collateral sources will reduce defendants'
liability. Such items as gratuitous payments from third parties,
insurance for which the plaintiff has paid, and those payments to
plaintiff which he must repay will not reduce the liability of the
defendant.4 It should be noted that these items are excluded because
of the particular circumstances of payment in each case, and for this
reason they are not recognized as mitigating in any jurisdictions.
This is the class of payments in which England previously held
disability benefits to exist until the principal case. Browning re-
moved disability payments from this list of exceptions in computing
loss of earnings.
The opinion of the court advances two reasons for this result.
First, most recoveries of this kind are paid by defendant's insurance
companies who in turn increase their premium charges to the general
public. These increased insurance rates cause the amount of such
recoveries to be borne by the general public, and this is against public
policy.6 Second, actual damages are not awarded to punish the
.wrongdoer; liability only accrues when the wrongdoer causes damage
and this damage is all that should be recompensed.'
'E.g., Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702
(1959) (insurance payments); Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390, 36 Am.
Rep. 624 (1880) (gratuity); Nelson v. Western Steam Nav. Co., 52 Wash.
177, 100 Pac. 325 (1909) (gratuitous medical services).
England still recognizes this class of exceptions. E.g., Bradburn v.
Great W. Ry., L.R. 10 Ex. 1 (1874) (insurance benefits which plaintiff has
bought with his own money); Redpath v. Belfast & County Down Ry.,
[1947] No. Ire. L.R. 167 (charitable gifts); Dennis v. London Passenger
Transp. Bd., 64 T.L.R. 269 (1948); Schneider v. Eisovitch, [1960] 2 Q.B.
430 (payments by third persons which plaintiff has undertaken to repay).
'Browning v. The War Office, [1963] 2 Weekly L.R. at 60-61.
'In a very learned discussion Diplock, L.J. says: "A person who acts
without reasonable care does no wrong in law; he commits no tort. He
only does wrong, he only commits a tort, if his lack of care causes damage to
the plaintiff. A defendant in an action for negligence is not a wrongdoer
at large; he is a wrongdoer only in respect of the damage which he actually
causes to the plaintiff. Thus in relation to damages for negligence, to speak
of the wrongdoer appropriating to himself the benefit of some fortuitous cir-
cumstance which has in fact reduced the loss which the plaintiff might other-
wise have sustained as a result of the defendant's negligence involves what
I respectfully think is an erroneous approach to the problem. Implicit in
such a statement is the tacit assumption that there is some norm of damages
which a defendant who has acted without reasonable care ought to pay for
his careless act, even though owing to some circumstances for which the
[Vol. 41
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In spite of the force of this reasoning, the majority of the Ameri-
can courts hold that pensions, whether being paid at present or antici-
pated in the future, should not be considered in assessing damages.,
Such holdings are based on the theory that the defendant should
not benefit from a collateral income which the plaintiff receives, even
if the total income after the injury exceeds income prior to the injury.
The rule supported by this reasoning is called the "collateral source
rule" and is stated as follows: "total or partial compensation for an
injury received from a collateral source wholly independent of the
wrongdoer will not operate to lessen the damages recoverable from
the responsible party."' The "collateral source rule" grows directly
from the punitive theory of damages which stresses the punishment
of the defendant.' 0 Consequently there is a qualification of the rule
that only those payments made wholly independent of the wrongdoer
shall not mitigate. If the wrongdoer has contributed to the collateral
funds then the amount of his liability will be reduced by the amount
of his contribution. This reduction in liability is readily illustrated
by the calculation of damages in suits against the United States
government brought by its employees. Disability pensions paid by
the government to servicemen are a mitigating factor since the gov-
ernment, as wrongdoer, has made the payments.'" The disability
defendant is not directly responsible the plaintiff has not in fact suffered a loss
corresponding to the norm." [1963] 2 Weekly L.R. at 62.8 E.g., Price v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Va. 1959); Hume
v. Lacey, 112 Cal. App. 2d 147, 245 P.2d 672 (1952); Mullins v. Bolinger,
115 Ind. App. 167, 55 N.E.2d 381 (1944) ; Rusk v. Jefferies, 110 N.J.L. 307,
164 Atl. 313 (1933); Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 73 Wash. 177, 131 Pac.
843 (1913). But see Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) where the
Court concluded that payments through servicemen's disability pensions
should be considered when the government is the defendant and will pay its
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
See 15 Am. Jur. Damages § 198 (1938).
"0 "There is, in addition to the compensatory aspect, a punitive one, a
notion that the defendant's moral fault subjects him to liability. The theory
of compensation stresses that the plaintiff must be paid; the punitive theory,
that the defendant must pay. Such a view of civil damages gives them the
function of criminal sanctions: to enforce adherence to set standards of con-
duct. But this function, although desirable, is not generally accepted as the
primary purpose of the civil action. A consequence of the punitive aspect
of damages is the 'collateral source rule.' Since liability for damages is often
considered inherent in the wrong, any mitigation of those damages, it is said,
would be a benefit to the defendant-a windfall. Therefore, courts generally
refuse to reduce damages where the plaintiff's loss has been (or will be)
compensated from some source collateral to the defendant's wrong." 63 HARV.
L. REv. 330, 331 (1949).
' See Tessier v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 779 (D.C. Mass.), aff'd,
269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959); Wuth v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D.
Va. 1958). This mitigation has been granted where the pensions are merely
1963]
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benefits are not received from a source wholly independent of the
wrongdoer and the collateral source doctrine does not apply. On the
other hand, civil service benefits are not a mitigating factor between
,the employees and the government since the employees contribute
to the funds from which benefits are paid.12 The benefits from these
funds are wholly independent of the wrongdoer and therefore the
"collateral source rule" applies.
It is obvious that the normal application of the collateral source
doctrine results in a windfall to the plaintiff. And, if the reasoning
of the English court is correct, how do the majority of American
courts justify the rule that disability pensions will not go to mitigate
a defendant's liability?"s The dissent in Browning expresses the
predominant American conclusion that pensions, such as the one in
the present case, are earned by the injured party's past services and
therefore are analogous to insurance payments.14  These insurance
payments (or pensions) having come from a collateral source wholly
independent of the wrongdoer should be excluded from the computa-
tion of defendant's liability. It is also pointed out in Browning that
disability pensions would be payable whether there was a tort or
not.'5 The single precedent to their payment is merely the occur-
rence of a disabling injury. Logic is conspicuous by its absence
when such payments are considered as compensation for the loss of
earnings inflicted by a tort.
In addition to the above reasoning there would seem to be
another strong argument for refusing reduction of loss by disability
pensions. In cases where these payments are being made, someone,
.either plaintiff or defendant, is going to profit from these collateral
payments whether they be considered as gratuities, insurance, or
earnings. Provided that the defendant is not in a position to pass
the loss to other parties,'6 it would seem to be the better reasoned
a likelihood or have actually been received. Snyder v. United States, 118
F. Supp. 585 (D.C. Md. 1953).
" See Price v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Va. 1959).
"Hume v. Lacey, 112 Cal. App. 2d 147, 245 P.2d 672 (1952); Ring v.
Minneapolis St. Ry., 176 Minn. 377, 223 N.W. 619 (1929); Texas Cities
Gas Co. v. Dickens, 156 S.W.2d 1010 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Cunnien v.
Superior Iron Works Co., 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767 (1921).[1963] 2 Weekly L.R. at 61.
15 Ibid.
'°It would seem that many potential defendants are in such a position.
Most private persons are covered by insurance of some type, while large




judgment to allow the plaintiff and not the defendant to profit. The
culpability of the defendant should bar his receiving a windfall- which
on the other hand would go to an innocent party.
North Carolina, like England, feels that compensation from col-
lateral sources should go to the mitigation of damages where it would
be unjust or inequitable to hold otherwise. 7 However, we have
not reached the point of allowing receipt of pensions by the injured
party to reduce the award of damages where the defendant was not
paying that pension." In Bryant v. Woodlief" the court, although
dealing with the problem of damages for wrongful death and not
personal injury, held that railroad retirement benefits which deceased
was receiving at time of death should be considered in computing the
damages for the wrongful death. In Bryant the court made state-
ments to the effect that retirement pay and other income for life
would be considered in an action for wrongful death.20 However,
the court in wrongful death actions bases the damages upon the
pecuniary loss to the estate of the decedent. This represents that
amount which would have accrued to the estate of the deceased
through his own efforts had he lived his normal life span. In per-
sonal injury actions the liability for lost earnings is based on com-
pensating the plaintiff. These funds also should represent amounts
which the plaintiff would have earned through his own efforts had
he not been disabled. Perhaps, therefore, the analogy would be
drawn to the effect that compensation for disability includes loss of
future earnings which would have accrued to the estate of the de-
1 North Carolina is a compensation state as is seen from the language in
Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452 (1935): "[A]ward no damages
based upon speculation, or no damages based upon imagination; but you
would be confined to the rule of law which the court gave you; that is, com-
pensatory damages that actually flow, that proximately flow and are neces-
sary for the results... of the wrong done the plaintiff by the defendant.. .
Id. at 89, 179 S.E. at 455.
" In Lane v. Southern Ry., 192 N.C. 287, 134 S.E. 855 (1926) a nineteen
year old soldier sued for injuries resulting in amputation of part of his hand.
He was allowed damages of $15,000 which the court held were not excessive.
The question of reduction of liability for loss of earning capacity due to
government pension was not raised since disability provisions were not
enacted until four years after the action by the amending act of July 3, 1930
(ch. 849, 46 Stat. 995). This act was a departure from the theory upon which
past legislation was based in that it granted monetary benefits to veterans
whose disabilities were not the result of service in actual combat.
19252 N.'C. 488, 114 S.E.2d 241 (1960), 39 N.C.L. REV. 107 (1961).
o "We do not understand that the general rule in this respect would ex-
clude the inclusion of income from an annuity, life estate, retirement pay or
other income for life only, in arriving at the pecuniary loss sustained by rea-
son of wrongful death.' 252 NC. at 494, 114 S.E.2d at 246. - '
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ceased in a wrongful death action, adopting in effect the English
view of allowing mitigation of lost earnings by disability pensions.
However, the question of how far the court will extend the holding
in Bryant is still unanswered since this particular aspect of the
decision has not been relied upon in any decision since Bryant was
decided.21
As stated earlier, the American courts allow pensions paid by
the government to a serviceman to mitigate any recovery by the
serviceman against the United States. One of these federal court
decisions applied North Carolina law.22 In support of such a result,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Holland v. Southern Public
Util. Co.,23 apparently relying on the following language of that
decision: "we think the weight of both authority and reason is to the
effect that any amount paid by anybody .... for and on account of
any injury or damage should be held for a credit on the total re-
covery in any action for the same injury or damage."24  This lan-
guage may indicate that our court will accept disability benefits as
an amount paid for and on account of an injury even though coming
from a third party. Undoubtedly, the acceptance of disability pen-
sions in reduction of damages in personal injury actions will find
strong support in the North Carolina cases when the question in its
purest form arises in this state.
It would seem highly inequitable to allow a tortfeasor to have a
reduction in liability because of mere chance or plaintiff's foresight.
But, it would appear that the plaintiff does not really "lose" those
earnings which are, in effect, guaranteed by third parties. North
Carolina has built a strong foundation for adopting the minority
view in regards to the compensation theory of damages. Moreover,
the court has indicated that it is not afraid to side with the minority
to expand our compensation theory where good judgment demands
it. 5 Regardless of which turn we take, when the question arises,
21 See 39 N.C.L. Rlv. 107 (1961).
United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949). It must be
remembered that this action involves one of those cases where the plaintiff
has been compensated in part by the defendant and is an exception to the
general rule followed in the United States.23208 N.C. 289, 180 S.E. 592 (1935).
,This same reasoning has recently been followed in Ramsey v. Camp,
254 N.C. 443, 119 S.E.2d 209 (1961), which also involved the issue of re-
duction of damages by consideration given for a covenant not to sue by a
third party.
"2 See Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962). Here the
question was presented of recovery by the plaintiff for hospital and doctor's
[Vol. 41
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we may have to discard all analogies and decide the issue by looking
to the equities of the case.26
ARNOLD T. WOOD
Dedication-Acceptance of Streets in Subdivision-Public User
X, owner of a subdivision, sold lots therein by reference to a
recorded map which showed the location of the lots and streets. Y
owned a lot outside the subdivision upon which he built a home. He
then opened his driveway onto a street in the subdivision. Although
this subdivision street, which connected two public highways, had
been regularly used by Y and other members of the general public
for at least two years, it had never been accepted or maintained by
public authority. When X barricaded the street, cutting off access
to Y's driveway, Y obtained a mandatory injunction for reopening
the street. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Owens v. Elliot,'
reversed. The court held that an effective dedication to the property
owners within the subdivision had been made, but as to the general
public there was only an offer of dedication, requiring formal accept-
ance by the proper public authorities before Y, as a member of the
general public, acquired a right to use the street.
When streets are shown on a recorded plat or map of a sub-
division two types of interests are created.2  First, purchasers of
bills which had been paid by the defendant under automobile medical pay-
ments insurance. The defendant's comprehensive insurance policy also con-
tained a liability clause for payment on behalf of defendant of any tort lia-
bility within policy limits. The medical payments clause called for payments
directly to injured persons regardless of the insured's negligence. The court,
after stating the majority view that recovery could be had under both clauses,
refused to allow a double recovery on the theory that there should be but
one recovery for one injury reghrdless of what the source of the compen-
sation.
8As stated by Lord Denning, M.R., in the principal case: "I prefer . . .
to discard . . . analogies and ask myself the simple question: is it fair and
just that, in assessing compensation, regard should be had to the fact that
Sergeant Browning is already, as of right, in receipt of nearly half his pay?
And my answer is, 'Yes.' He ought not receive compensation twice over.
If he had remained in the Air Force, he would not have received both his pay
and his pension. Nor should he do so now." [1963] 2 Weekly L.R. at 58.
1 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962). This case was before the court
on appeal in 257 N.C. 250, 125 S.E.2d 589 (1962), where a judgment for
damages was reversed. It was remanded to determine the injunction issue
in light of pertinent evidence.
2 See, e.g., Russell v. Coggin, 232 N.C. 674, 62 S.E.2d 70 (1950), where
the court stated, in effect, that when an owner subdivides and sells in refer-
ence to a plat or map, he dedicates the streets to the public in general and the
purchasers in particular. See generally 11 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL Con-
1963]
